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ISSUE

ARight to Talk
Has Justice Antonin Scalia compromised his objectivity with a public remark?
With two assisted suicide cases scheduled for
argument before the Supreme Court this term,
Justice Antonin Scalia already has publicly staked out
his position on the issue.
While sentiments he expressed in 1990 in
Cruzan v.Director,MissouriDepartment of Health,
497 U.S. 261, are well-known, Scalia told an
audience at Catholic University late last year that
it is "absolutely plain there isno [constitutionall
right to die."
Is it proper for sitting judges to make such
statements? While no one would deny Scalia his First

Amendment right to say what he pleases, that hardly
quells concerns about the advisability of making
such statements.
Vincent Martin Bonventre, a professor at
Albany Law School in New York state, contends that
Scalia crossed a line, robbing the public of its
confidence injustices' open-mindedness and
willingness to consider each case on its own merits.
For Lloyd B.Snyder, a professor at ClevelandMarshall Law School, not only is Scalia well within
the boundaries of propriety, but he has done lawyers
and potential litigants a favor by speaking so openly.

Yes: Litigants deserve a justice with an open mind
At best, Justice Scalia's remarks were
imprudent. To be sure, few Court watchers
were surprised to learn that Scalia finds
the idea of a constitutionally based right to
die unpersuasive. His previous expressions
on the subject, on and off the bench, as well
as his views about judicially cognizable
liberties, have left little doubt about his
I
beliefs on such questions.
But Scalia's unqualified declarations
B
"It's absolutely plain there is no right to die"
and "It doesn't belong in the Supreme Court i
as a constitutional question"-evince a
closed mind, an unconditional rejection and,
S
indeed, a hostility about a specific issue
being argued in pending appeals. As a sitting member of the Court, Scalia will be
participating in the disposition of those
appeals. As a judicial official, he has the
responsibility to consider the issue as a
neutral, unbiased magistrate. It is difficult
to imagine how Scalia can function as such.
In many ways, Scalia is refreshing. He
is outspoken and candid. He is a public official who shares his views with the public.
Anyone can learn his position on textualism, original intent, federalism, judicial usurpation and inappropriate resolution of complex social problems in the
courts, to name a few. Whether he intends it or not,
Scalia is a walking, talking rebuttal of the nonsensical
notion of judges as detached intellects with no preconceptions, predispositions, personal convictions or philosophical outlooks that affect their decision-making.
But Scalia has gone beyond the bounds of candor.
His categorical repudiation of a right to die crossed the
line into the injudicious. It is not that judges should keep
their opinions to themselves; they should keep their
minds open. It is not that judges should feign neutrality;

they should actually remain undecided. It is
not that judges should give litigants a false
sense of confidence; they should truly listen
to and consider the arguments. A judgelike anyone-may be predisposed; but his or
her decision ought not to be preordained.
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990) treats comments and behavior
that raise questions about neutrality as unethical. Canon 3(B)(9) warns against "any
public comment" by a judge that might "impair [the] fairness" of any pending or impending proceeding. Canon 4(A)(1) similarly
admonishes judicial officers to avoid all "extra-judicial activities" that might "cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act
impartially." And Canon 3(E)(1) prescribes
disqualification of a judge whenever "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
An argument could certainly be made
t that Scalia's remarks fall within the purview of those provisions. Surely, the parties
urging the Court to give constitutional effect
to their choice to die have every reason to
believe that Scalia's mind is already fixed
against their claims. They have every reason to believe
that they begin with only eight, not nine, possible votes.
Scalia's remarks have variously been labeled indiscreet, injudicious, very poor form and an embarrassment to the Court. Legal commentators have largely
refrained-openly, that is-to call them unethical. Suffice it to say that his remarks would seem to contravene the spirit of the judicial code to maintain impartiality and fairness, as well as the appearance thereof.
In that sense, his outright dismissal of any right to
die was at least unfortunate and unwise. As he himself
might well acknowledge, the advocacy of personal opinion does not mix easily with the role of neutral arbiter.
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No: Lawyers always want to know what a judge is thinking
In 1990 Justice Scalia wrote in the
Cruzan case that there is no right to die.
In 1996 he said the same thing in a speech
at Catholic University. The first statement has raised nary an eyebrow. The remarks at Catholic University, however,
have engendered much editorial comment
suggesting that it was not proper for
Scalia to say in public what he had previously written for publication.
The fact that two right-to-die cases
are pending before the Supreme Court has
energized the criticism about his remarks.
I am at a loss to understand this misguid-

the judges before whom they appear, and
they use this information in advising their
clients. The lawyers asserting a right to die
in the cases currently before the Supreme
Court have read the Cruzan case. They
know where Justice Scalia stands. And
they have, most likely, advised their clients
accordingly.
Both the lawyers and the clients knew
after the Catholic University speech just
what they knew before the speech: Justice
Scalia is a lost cause on this issue. To win,
the attorneys will have to pitch their argu-

ments to the other justices.

In fact, I would bet that the lawyers

ed criticism.
Scalia's critics have not suggested
that he has done anything illegal. The
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
would defeat any such argument. That
amendment prohibits governmental laws
or regulations that abridge freedom of
speech.
O
Scalia has the same constitutional
right to state his thoughts about the great
issues of the day as you and I have. The
Constitution of the United States does not contain an
escape clause authorizing restrictions on the rights of
attorneys, judges or Supreme Court justices.
The criticism of the justice is more subtle. Critics
say that Scalia has exercised bad form; he has been
indiscreet. What is the great evil behind this indiscretion?
It is that the parties involved in the cases now before the Court will lose faith in our justice system if
they learn the justice's views prior to his decision in
their case. The public at large will also, we are told,
lose confidence in the impartiality ofjudges. Nonsense.
Competent lawyers always research the views of

would prefer to have had some of the other
justices those who have not expressed
views in prior cases-speak about the rightto-die issue. Nothing is more frustrating for
an attorney than appearing before a judge
without having a handle on the questions
that most concern the judge.
or Nor is the public at large likely to gain
or lose respect for our legal system based on
the contents of Scalia's remarks. To the extent that they care about the issue at all, they are more
likely to be concerned about whether Scalia is right
than whether he has expressed his views in a concurring opinion or a speech.
I seriously doubt that the propriety of the forum
for judicial comment is at the forefront of public concern about our legal system.
So if the public at large does not care, and if attorneys and clients want to know as much as they can
about the views of judges they appear before, who is
harmed by public statements of judges about important issues?
My point exactly. Let the man talk.
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